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An “Immeasurable Sign of Great Hope”: The Detroit 
Institute of the Arts, Municipal Bankruptcy and 
“Cultural Assets” 
Rebecca Gosch

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit (the City) filed a voluntary 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition.
1
 Although certainly not the first 
municipality with large debts to turn to bankruptcy,
2
 the City’s filing 
is on a historic scale, as the City attempts to manage its estimated 
$18.5 billion in debt through the bankruptcy court.
3
 The scale of the 
City’s bankruptcy is unprecedented.
4
 For that very reason, this case is 
certain to create precedent for the management of large-scale 
municipal bankruptcies, both during and after the bankruptcy process 
has officially concluded. 
Municipal bankruptcy differs from other bankruptcy contexts 
because of the public nature of the entity in financial distress.
5
 Due to 
 
 
 J.D. (2016), Washington University School of Law. I am indebted to Chief Judge 
Phillip J. Shefferly and his staff for providing me with invaluable insight into the bankruptcy 
system and Detroit. I am also deeply grateful to my family and friends: thanks and love to you 
all.  
 1. In re City of Detroit, Mich. 504 B.R. 97, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 2. Other large-scale municipal bankruptcy filings include Jefferson County, Alabama in 
2011, Orange County, California in 1994, San Bernardino, California in 2012, and Stockton, 
California in 2012. Alexander E.M. Hess, Michael B. Sauter & Samuel Wrigley, The Largest 
Municipal Bankruptcies in U.S. History, 24/7 WALL ST. (July 9, 2013), http://247wallst. 
com/special-report/2013/07/19/the-largest-municipal-bankruptcies-in-u-s-history/2/. Jefferson 
County’s estimated liabilities were only $3.2 billion dollars, compared to Detroit’s estimate of 
$18.5 billion. Id. 
 3. Id.; see also In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 113. 
 4. Hess et al., supra note 2. Jefferson County’s bankruptcy of $3.2 million dollars is the 
second largest municipal bankruptcy; the City’s estimated debt is almost six times greater than 
that amount. Id. 
 5. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2014), see infra note 61. One of the most drastic ways that individual citizens have 
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the important roles citizens play, already complex legal issues can be 
further complicated by the very human concerns of a municipal 
population. One such complex issue in the City’s bankruptcy case 
was the public debate over the impressive art collection of the Detroit 
Institute of the Arts (DIA).
6
 Creditors hoping to receive higher 
payments on the substantial debts owed to them have argued that the 
collection should be monetized in some fashion.
7
 Others have argued 
that this cultural asset is essential to the future of the City.
8
 
Therefore, the decision reached about whether monetizing the DIA 
art collection was permissible or appropriate could potentially serve 
as a model for other cities facing dire financial situations.  
One of the many reasons the art collection of the DIA became 
such a divisive issue was because the debate actually centered on the 
tension between competing versions of what cities are expected to 
provide to their citizens.
9
 When municipalities are insolvent, citizens 
can lose essentials: police and firemen, sanitation services, and 
pension payments.
10
 Yet many expect more from their cities.
11
 For 
example, citizens also place a premium on the cultural aspects of a 
city, viewing it as a place where art and culture can flourish.
12
 The 
 
been affected by the bankruptcy in this case is in the cuts made to city employee pension plans. 
For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 72. 
 6. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 167. 
 9. Khalil AlHajal, Bankruptcy Judge Prods Creditors to Reveal Exactly What They Want 
from Detroit, MLIVE.COM (Sept. 3, 2014, 7:56 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/ 
index.ssf/2014/09/bankruptcy_judge_prods_credito.html. Before Judge Rhodes, creditors 
argued that the art collection was not an asset needed for “health, welfare and safety;” therefore, 
it could be monetized. Id. The DIA, however, argued that protecting the collection was “about 
respecting people’s right to art and culture.” Id. 
 10. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 261. “A large number of people in this City are 
suffering hardship because of what has been antiseptically called service delivery insolvency.” 
Service delivery insolvency is defined as the inability “to provide basic municipal services, 
such as police, fire, and emergency medical services to protect the health and safety of the 
people here. Detroit’s inability to provide adequate municipal services runs deep and has for 
years. It is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.” Id. at 261–62. 
 11. See AlHajal, supra note 9. Citizens may argue, like the DIA did, that people have a 
“right to art and culture.” Id. 
 12. In the case approving the bankruptcy plan, the court noted that culture, education and 
civic pride are all values that “[e]very great city in the world actively pursues.” Id. at 218. 
Furthermore, “[t]hey are the values that Detroit must pursue to uplift, inspire and enrich its 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/14
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City’s bankruptcy case provided an excellent example of the tension 
between the desire for high culture and the need for basic services. 
Amid bankruptcy discussions about what to do with the City’s world-
class art collection, a national outcry arose over the City’s decision to 
turn off the water of residents with outstanding water bills.
13
 And 
while “Detroit-loyal philanthropists” have invested a great deal in the 
City,
14
 the median household income between 2010 and 2014 was 
only $26,095, with 39.8 percent of the population living in poverty in 
2014.
15
 Considering the need for basic services now along with 
problems that may arise in the future raises questions about the 
proper weighing of short-term necessities against long term 
“viability.”
16
 The art collection of the DIA, which became a central 
issue in the City’s bankruptcy case,
17
 is a vivid example of these 
tensions and is especially interesting in the context of a municipal 
bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
residents and its visitors. They are also the values that Detroit must pursue to compete in the 
national and global economy to attract new residents, visitors and businesses.” Id.  
 13. Joe Guillen & Matt Helms, Detroiters Testify About Water Shutoffs, Lack of Aid, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-
bankruptcy/2014/09/22/bankruptcy-water-hearing/16045643/. 
 14. Holman Jenkins, A Solvent Detroit Isn’t a Self-Sustaining Detroit, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/holman-jenkins-a-solvent-detroit-isnt-a-self-sustaining-
detroit-1416006470. 
 15. Detroit (City) QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). Detroit 
has obvious economic problems, especially when compared to the medians in the rest of the 
state. The median household income in Michigan for 2010 to 2014 was $49,087, with 16.2 
percent of the population living below the poverty level. Michigan (State) QuickFacts from the 
US Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST0 
45215/26,2622000 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
 16. Joe Guillen & Brent Snavely, Rhodes Signals DIA Is Crucial for Detroit’s Viability, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-
bankruptcy/2014/09/17/bankruptcy-dia-plummer/15799233/. In order for a municipal 
bankruptcy plan to be approved, the municipality must show that the plan will lead to a “viable” 
city. Id. “Experts argue that a ‘viable’ city is not just a city that can deliver fire and police 
protection. Id. ‘Viable’ cities also must offer other services such as parks and recreation and 
cultural attractions if they are going to retain residents and attract businesses.” Id. This 
argument indicates the tension inherent in the word “viability.” Is something more than 
economic stability and growth crucial to the understanding? Does viability include culture as 
well? The answers to these questions impact how one will analyze the overall success of the 
City’s bankruptcy plan. Id. 
 17. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
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This Note will begin, in Part II, by giving a brief history of the 
City and the DIA. It will also provide an overview of the bankruptcy 
process and specific concepts underlying municipal bankruptcies. 
Further, Part II will discuss the bankruptcy court’s decision that 
approved the City’s proposed plan to exit bankruptcy. Next, Part III 
offers an analysis of the impacts this case will have in future large-
scale municipal bankruptcies. Finally, Part IV outlines a proposal for 
statutory changes to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. These 
proposed changes would better reflect the complex balancing act 
municipalities face during bankruptcy: the tensions between 
essentials and culture, as well as economic and social viability. With 
new provisions in place, future municipalities may be able to avoid 
embroilment in problems, like the City’s,18 in the future.  
II. HISTORY 
A. The City of Detroit 
The City was incorporated in 1815.
19
 In 1896, Henry Ford built 
his first car in the City.
20
 Of course, it was “the method of building 
cars that he would later devise—the moving assembly line—that put 
the world on wheels”.21 Due to Henry Ford’s influence, the City 
became “Motor City;”22 it played a “key role” in the industrialization 
of America throughout the twentieth century.
23
 The automobile 
industry became a key employer for many Americans, and “Detroit 
was its epicenter.”24 With changes in how the automobile industry 
 
 18. Matthew Dolan, Cost of Detroit’s Historic Bankruptcy Reaches $126 Million, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/costofdetroitshistoricbankruptcyreach 
126million1410557043. In September of 2014, legal fees for the City were already estimated to 
be about $126 million. Id. 
 19. Choose Detroit, DTOURS, http://www.dtoursdetroit.com/choose-detroit/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2016). The City began as a French fort and remained French until it passed into the 
hands of the British in 1760. It officially became American as a result of Jay’s Treaty in 1796. 
Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Thomas J. Sugrue, Motor City: The Story of Detroit, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. 
HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/politics-reform/essays/motor-city-story-detroit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/14
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functioned and losses in entry level jobs, the City began a decline to 
becoming “the embodiment of America’s urban woes.”25 The City 
was also severely tested by the financial crisis of 2008.
26
 Fear that 
inaction would lead to the loss of “more than one million jobs, 
billions in lost personal savings, and significantly reduced economic 
production”27 sparked the “controversial 2008–09 government bailout 
of the auto industry.”28  
Since the wake of the financial crisis, the City’s population has 
also been declining.
29
 In 1940, the City was the fourth most populous 
in the United States.
30
 By 2012, it had fallen to the eighteenth most 
populous city in the country.
31
 This decline in population has been 
accompanied by extensive blight, which is currently pervasive in the 
City.
32
 After decades of “population loss, rampant debt and financial 
mismanagement,”33 the City was left “struggling to provide basic 
services to residents.”34 It was during this climate of decline that the 
City filed for bankruptcy.
35
 
 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2016). Around the 1950s, one in six working Americans were employed 
by the auto industry. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Peter Weber, The U.S. Auto Bailout Is Officially Over. Here’s What America Lost and 
Gained, THE WEEK (Dec. 10, 2013), http://theweek.com/articles/454749/auto-bailout-officially-
over-heres-what-america-lost-gained. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Population of the 20 Largest U.S. Cities, 1900–2012, INFOPLEASE http://www.info 
please.com/ipa/A0922422.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 30. Id. Detroit reached its highest population in 1940, when it had approximately 1.6 
million people, placing it behind only New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Id. 
 31. Id. By 2012, the City’s population had dropped to only 701,475. Id. 
 32. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 166–67 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). The 
Court found that “blight in Detroit is extensive.” Id. The Court also painted a vivid picture of 
the problem, saying that “[t]he statistics do not fully convey its extent or impact. In 
neighborhood after neighborhood, short and long stretches of streets have abandoned 
structures—they can no longer be called homes—that are intimidating hulks.” Id. Succinctly 
summarizing the situation, the Court stated “it is heartbreaking, maddening and sad.” Id.  
 33. Lisa Lambert, Detroit Wins Court Approval for Plan to Exit Bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 7, 2014, at 2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Stephen Eide, Detroit’s Bankruptcy and Its Painful Reforms, AM. INTEREST (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/04/detroits-bankruptcy-and-its-painful-
reforms/. Amongst the problems that led to bankruptcy were “the collapse of the auto industry, 
rising poverty, blight and crime, the white and black middle class’ flight to the suburbs, and a 
legendarily dysfunctional city government.” Id.  
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B. The Detroit Institute of the Arts 
The DIA began as an independent nonprofit in 1885; seeking 
financial help, the DIA became a city department in 1919.
36
 From 
1919 until 1998, the DIA’s art collection was considered property of 
the City, with the City paying for some future acquisitions by the 
DIA.
37
 However, in 1998, the DIA regained control of its own 
operations; thus, it is not currently directly affiliated with the City.
38
 
In evaluating the assets available to the City in bankruptcy, the City’s 
previous “ownership makes the DIA’s governance structure different 
from almost all other major American museums, organized as 
nonprofit private entities.”
39
 This history also makes the absence of 
any provisions about what to do in case of municipal bankruptcy 
especially problematic, as the question of what impact the DIA’s past 
involvement with the municipality helped create the potential for the 
monetization of the art collection.
40
 
The City owns the museum building and the art collection.
41
 
Under the current operating agreement between the City and the DIA, 
however, which is in effect until 2023, “art institute services” are 
overseen by The Detroit Institute of Arts, a non-profit corporation.
42
 
 
 36. Guillen & Snavely, supra note 16, at 1. 
 37. Dan Austin, Detroit Museum of Art, HIST. DETROIT, http://www.historicdetroit.org/ 
building/detroit-museum-of-art/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). From 1919 until 1998, the “art was 
to become property of the city . . . and just as important, the city would be in charge of picking 
up the tab for future acquisitions.” However, there was some dispute over whether the art 
collection was property of the City or if, instead, the DIA merely held the art in trust for the 
City. Id. 
 38. Guillen & Helms, supra note 13, at 1. While now clearly separated from the City, 
there is no clear contractual provision in the operating agreement about what happens to the 
DIA or its art collection in the case of a municipal bankruptcy.  
 39. Beverly S. Jacoby, In Detroit Bankruptcy, Why DIA Art Values Varied So Much, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/ 
10/04/dia-art-value-detroit-bankruptcy/16670663/. Even though the DIA is no longer a city 
department, the fact that it once was one makes the governing structure different from many 
other American museums.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Melanie Kruvelis, Timeline: The Complicated Relationship Between the DIA and the 
City of Detroit, MICH. RADIO NEWSROOM (Mar. 27, 2014), http://michiganradio.org/post/ 
timeline-complicated-relationship-between-dia-and-city-detroit#stream/0. 
 42. Art Institute Service Agreement Between the Wayne County Art Institute Authority and 
the Detroit Institute of Arts, Inc., http://www.dia.org/user_area/uploads/Wayne%20County%20 
Service%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/14
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According to the website, the non-profit corporation is “run by a 
volunteer board of directors, which appoints and supervises the 
museum’s director.”43  
The DIA’s art is widely regarded as a “world-class collection”
44
 
and an important cultural landmark of the City.
45
 The bankruptcy 
court found the art museum so important that it described the DIA as 
a “critical and immeasurable sign of great hope and determination in 
the City.”
46
  
Of more interest to creditors, however, is the estimated value of 
the collection’s pieces.
47
 Estimations of the collection’s value vary 
widely.
48
 One creditor assessed the collection as up to $8.5 billion 
dollars.
49
 An appraisal from 2014 found a more modest estimate of 
between $2.7 billion and $4.6 billion.
50
 Some experts caution that 
these are inflated figures, as “donor lawsuits, weakness in the market 
for some kinds of paintings, and lower sale prices because of the 
sheer bulk that would flood into the market” could affect actual sale 
prices.
51
 For these various reasons, if the DIA sold the collection, 
reports indicate that it “might raise as little as $850 million.”
52
  
 
 43. Museum Fact Sheet, DETROIT INST. ARTS, http://www.dia.org/about/facts.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Museum Fact Sheet]. 
 44. Jim Kiertzner, Live Blog: Testimony Continues in Detroit Bankruptcy Trial, WXYZ 
DETROIT (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.wxyz.com/news/region/detroit/live-blog-testimony-
continues-in-detroit-bankruptcy-trial. Some of the most famous pieces held by the museum 
include “The Wedding Dance” by Pieter Bruegel the Elder, one of Vincent van Gogh’s self-
portraits, and “The Visitation” by Rembrandt. Matisse, Poussin, and Warhol are other famous 
artists represented in the collection. Art at the DIA: Collections, DETROIT INST. ARTS, 
http://www.dia.org/art/ (last accessed Sept. 13, 2016). 
 45. Kiertzner, supra note 44. See also Guillen & Snavely, supra note 16, at 2 (“But if the 
museum is forced to sell its works of art, its reputation as one of the nation’s top museums 
would evaporate.”).  
 46. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 47. AlHajal, supra note 9. 
 48. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 39, at 1; Randy Kennedy, New Appraisal Sets Value of 
Detroit Institute Artworks at Up to $8.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://arts 
beat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/new-appraisal-sets-value-of-detroit-institute-artworks-at-
up-to-8-5-billion/?_r=0. 
 49. Kennedy, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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C. Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy is, ultimately, a process that “serves to mitigate the 
effects of financial failure.”
53
 The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors 
and the creditors of the debtors a structured way to decide which 
creditors should be paid, the amount each creditor should receive, and 
the order in which creditors should be paid.
54
 In order to file for 
bankruptcy, a debtor must select the applicable chapter under which 
to file.
55
 The different chapters are designed to protect and apply to 
different kinds of debtors, and therefore, each chapter has specific 
rules that do not apply universally.
56
 For debtors, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that “[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code 
is to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”
57
 
Creditors of the debtor may also benefit from bankruptcy.
58
 Through 
the process of bankruptcy, in either a liquidation or reorganization, 
“creditors of equal priority receive ratable and equitable 
distributions.”
59
  
 
 53. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2014). 
 54. Id. Because the Bankruptcy Code is found in the United States Code, “United States 
bankruptcy law is federal law.” Id. 
 55. Id. ¶ 1.01[2]. 
 56. 2-103 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 103.01(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2014). Besides the chapters under which bankruptcy is actually filed, “Chapters 1, 3, 
and 5, the first three chapters, contain general provisions that apply, with some exceptions, to 
all the other chapters of the Code.” Id. “Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 are the chapters that 
offer relief under the Code, and are the chapters under which cases are actually filed.” Id. 
 57. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 
498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)).  
 58. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 1.01[1]. Creditors are those with 
secured or unsecured claims against the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. Id. In the City’s 
bankruptcy case, there are seventeen separate classes of creditors, some with multiple divisions 
within a class. Some of these classes of creditors have secured claims; others’ claims are 
unsecured. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 199–200 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 59. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 1.01[1]. This serves another prime 
bankruptcy policy: the “equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.” Id. (quoting 
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Congress., 
1st Sess. 177-78 (1977))). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/14
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The purposes behind the chapters of the Bankruptcy Code differ.
60
 
For instance, Chapter 7 is titled “Liquidation.”
61
 Under this chapter, 
the bankruptcy process liquidates the available assets of the debtor to 
repay debts.
62
 Compare this to Chapter 13, titled “Adjustment of 
Debts of an Individual with Regular Income.”
63
 Here, a bankruptcy 
court will try to devise a plan that decreases the debt owed and allows 
the debtor to pay back the debt owed by paying regularly into a 
plan.
64
 The titles of these chapters alone indicate that each chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Code has a distinct function.
65
 
D. Municipal Bankruptcy 
The City filed bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which is titled “Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality.”
66
 The 
primary goal behind municipal bankruptcy is to ensure that the 
essentials of a city, namely the “continued provision of public 
services,” remain intact.
67
 This goal means that the chapter exists “to 
permit a financially distressed public entity to seek protection from 
its creditors while it formulates and negotiates a plan for adjustment 
of its debts.”
68
 Municipal bankruptcy can be most closely analogized 
to corporate reorganization, which occurs under Chapter 11 of the 
 
 60. See generally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 700.01; 8 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1300.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014). 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1986). 
 62. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 700.01. This type of relief involves the 
“collection, liquidation, and distribution of nonexempt property of the debtor.” Id. 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1984). 
 64. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, ¶ 1300.01. The plan, in cases dealing 
with individuals, sets out how the debtor will make payments to creditors, and this is usually 
done by distribution of income, as opposed to the liquidation of assets, although both are 
possible. Id. 
 65. See 11 U.S.C. § 701; 11 U.S.C. § 1301. Because the Bankruptcy Code serves different 
types of debtors, different chapters are necessary in order for the process to be tailored to each 
case. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
 66. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 159–60 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); 11 
U.S.C. § 901 (2010). 
 67. In re Mount Carbon Metropolitan Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). The 
goal of continuing services takes precedence over future profit. Id. 
 68. In re Magma Irr. & Drainage Dist., 193 B.R. 528, 535–36 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) 
(quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 900.02 (15th Ed. 1994)). 
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Bankruptcy Code.
69
 However, “unlike chapter 11, chapter 9 does not 
attempt to balance the right of the municipality and its creditors.”
70
  
Chapter 9 is also not a chapter focused primarily on an individual 
debtor or a corporation, and therefore, the public has a greater role to 
play. It is the “public nature of the entity experiencing financial 
difficulties” that ensures that “there is no provision in the law for 
liquidation of its assets and distribution of the proceeds to 
creditors.”
71
 Indeed, the public whom the municipality serves can be 
a creditor of the municipality.
72
 When the public becomes a creditor, 
the municipality must balance the tension between serving the public 
and being indebted to it. This tension makes municipal bankruptcy 
singular amongst other bankruptcy processes,
73
 and Chapter 9 
ensures that the courts undergo unique considerations whenever it is 
utilized.
74
 
E. The City’s Bankruptcy Case 
The first step in filing bankruptcy was for the City to establish that 
it was eligible to file for bankruptcy.
75
 After establishing eligibility, 
the City next filed a bankruptcy plan, which is simply an organized 
 
 69. Id. at 535–36. 
 70. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 900.01[2] (“In fact, a dissatisfied 
creditor is in large measure provided with only one remedy in a chapter 9 case, i.e., seeking 
dismissal of the chapter 9 case.”).  
 71. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 900.01[1]. 
 72. See generally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 901.04[12]. This was the 
case for the City. Since the City owed former city employees pension payments and did not 
have money to pay for these pensions, the City became in debt to these employees. Therefore, 
they were creditors of the City for purposes of the bankruptcy case. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 
524 B.R. 147, 169–70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 73. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 900.01[1]. 
 74. Id. One key consideration is the public nature of the entity; due to that public element, 
the municipality cannot be liquidated in the same way a corporation might. Id. Furthermore, 
such a liquidation, if somehow carried out, would raise Constitutional concerns. Id. 
 75. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 190 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). The court 
decided that the City was eligible to file bankruptcy and that bankruptcy law may trump the 
Michigan constitutional provisions that protect pension benefits. Id. See also Matt Helms, 
Federal Judges Put a Halt to Appeals in Detroit Bankruptcy Case, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 
1, 2014), http://www.freep.com/article/20140801/NEWS01/308010161/1001/news. This 
decision was immediately appealed, but has been stayed until the current trial about the City’s 
bankruptcy plan’s feasibility concludes. Id. 
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structuring of debt repayment that must be approved by the court 
before the municipality may officially exit bankruptcy.
76
 “Every 
creditor group” objected to the first plan filed, which included no 
settlement agreement with any creditor.”
77
 Subsequently, and only 
after court-ordered mediation, the City reached settlements with 
virtually every objecting creditor;
78
 these settlements allowed the 
City to file an eighth amended plan
79
 for the court’s approval.
80
 
Chief amongst the settlements made between the City and various 
creditor groups was what has come to be known as the “Grand 
Bargain.”
81
 In this agreement, the State of Michigan agreed to donate 
approximately $194.8 million to the City to help satisfy creditors.
82
 
Furthermore, various philanthropic foundations and benefactors of 
the DIA pledged to contribute $466 million to the City to prevent the 
art collection from being monetized.
83
 In return, the City has agreed 
 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (1978) reads: “The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the 
debtor’s debts. If such a plan is not filed with the petition, the debtor shall file such a plan at 
such later time as the court fixes.” 
 77. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 160. Some creditors also filed objections to the plan 
before such a plan was even filed. This was one of the reasons why the Court ordered 
mediation, to try to have the City reach settlements with the various creditor classes. The 
creditors varied greatly in this case, ranging from entities such as Oakland County and the 
United States, to financial groups like Syncora and FGIC, and including organizations 
representing the City’s firefighters and police officers. Id. at 163–65. 
 78. Id. at 160. The City achieved settlement with every group who was represented by 
counsel, with the exception of some creditors who asserted Constitutional claims against the 
plan. The court addressed these objections in its opinion that approved the plan. Id. 
 79. The City filed multiple plans because, as it reached settlements and agreements with 
creditors, each proposed plan had to be adjusted to reflect new settlements between the City and 
its creditors. Id. at 161. 
 80. Id. at 160. The eighth amended plan included the settlements that the City had reached 
with the creditor groups at that time. These settlements ensured “the settling creditors’ support 
of the plan and their withdrawal of their litigation against the City and their objections to the 
plan.” Id. 
 81. Id. at 169. This term refers to the “collection of settlements among a number of parties 
with an interest in the City’s two pension plans and in protecting the City’s art at the DIA.” Id.  
 82. Id. at 170. 
 83. Id. at 176. Of the total $466 million being contributed to the City’s pension plans 
under the DIA settlement, $366 million will come from various local and national 
organizations. Id. The DIA itself has pledged to secure $100 million of the total $466 million 
from “individuals, local foundations and the business community.” Id. This amount will be 
equally divided between the two pension plans over twenty years. Id. 
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to transfer any right to the DIA’s art collection to a perpetual 
charitable trust for the benefit of the City.
84
 
The Grand Bargain offered a solution to what was one of the most 
“contentious issues” of the City’s bankruptcy case.
85
 In any 
bankruptcy case, establishing the assets available to creditors is 
crucial in determining the amount of money that will be ultimately 
available to creditors.
86
 This issue was discussed at trial, as the City 
argued it had submitted a plan that would allow the City to exit 
bankruptcy without using the DIA’s art collection as an asset to pay 
creditors.
87
 After weeks of trial, on November 7, 2014, “Detroit won 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court approval . . . for a road map to end its fiscal 
free fall and revitalize a city sinking under a huge debt load.”
88
 The 
Grand Bargain saved the art collection of the DIA from the threat of 
future creditor recoveries.
89
  
The court was ultimately of the opinion that in any litigation 
“concerning the City’s right to sell the DIA art, or concerning the 
creditors’ rights to access the art to satisfy its claims, the positions of 
. . . the DIA almost certainly would prevail.”90 The Grand Bargain 
ensured that the DIA is contributing to the overall amount being paid 
to the creditors.
91
 However, the court determined that this 
contribution would not come from the monetization of the art 
collection.
92
 This meant that the court approved the City’s bankruptcy 
plan, which included the Grand Bargain, despite the fact that the art 
collection of the DIA was not utilized in paying back the City’s 
extreme debt.
93
 
 
 84. Id. Specifically, the “City has agreed to transfer all of its right, title and interest in the 
art to the DIA to be held in a perpetual charitable trust for the benefit of the people of the City 
and the State.” Id. It was expressly stated that “[t]his will be a permanent transfer, free and clear 
of all liens, encumbrances, claims and interests of the City or its creditors.” Id. 
 85. Id. The court itself acknowledged that the “extent to which the bankruptcy code 
requires the City to sell or otherwise monetize the art at the DIA to pay creditors” was a central 
issue of the bankruptcy case. Id. 
 86. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 53, ¶ 1.03. 
 87. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 175. 
 88. Lambert, supra note 33. 
 89. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 175. 
 90. Id. at 179. 
 91. Id. at 176. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 175. 
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In analyzing whether the art could be an asset, conflicting 
positions arose about whether the art could be accessed by the City in 
any way.
94
 The court found that “the creditors did submit substantial 
evidence and legal grounds supporting the . . . view that the City can 
legally sell or monetize the DIA art.”95 The most compelling support 
for this argument came from the facts that the DIA was a branch of 
the city government for many years and the municipality acquired 
much of the art during more prosperous days.
96
 In 11 U.S.C. § 902, 
the Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” for purposes of 
a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
97
 Section 902 states that “‘property of the 
estate’, when used in a section that is made applicable in a case under 
this chapter by section 103(e) or 901 of this title, means property of 
the debtor.”98 Applying this simple definition, if the City “owned” the 
art collection, then the art collection would meet the definition of 
being “property of the debtor,”99 and it would be deemed accessible 
to the City. 
Contradicting this argument, the DIA argued that the art collection 
could not be sold to satisfy the City’s debts.100 First, although the 
DIA had been a City department for many years, “in 1955 Detroit 
stopped contributing anything to its operation and in 1997 the 
independent DIA board was given sole management 
responsibility.”101 Second, the DIA argued that “all of the art at the 
 
 94. Id. at 176. “Several parties, including at times the City itself, have taken the position 
that the City holds title to several significant pieces of art in the DIA and has the right to sell 
them outright to pay its obligations to creditors.” Several other parties, including, but not 
limited to, the DIA, “have taken the position that the art that the City purchased or that others 
contributed to it is held in public trust for the citizens of the City and the State, and cannot be 
sold to satisfy the City’s debts.” Id.  
 95. Id. at 178. The most compelling example of this evidence expressly addressed by the 
court was that the operating agreement for the DIA stated: “[t]he City shall retain title to and 
ownership of the (a) City art collection and (b) the DIA properties.” Id. at 178. 
 96. See Kruvelis, supra note 41. 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 902 (2006). Due to the special nature of Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
proceedings, the definition of what is “property of the estate” varies between chapters. Compare 
11 U.S.C. § 902 with 11 U.S.C. § 541, which has a much more complex set of rules for what 
becomes property of the bankruptcy estate. 
 98. § 902. 
 99. Id. 
 100. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 176. 
 101. Daniel Fisher, How Detroit Saved Its Art From the Bill Collectors, FORBES (Nov. 7, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/11/07/how-detroit-saved-its-art-collection-
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 51:233 
 
 
DIA is held in charitable trust for the benefit of the people of the 
State and so it cannot be sold to pay the City’s debts.”102  
This claim tied into the City’s third argument, which was that any 
plan that monetized the art collection would come at the cost of 
drawn out legal battles.
103
 When Annmarie Erickson, the executive 
vice president of the DIA, testified at trial about the feasibility of the 
current bankruptcy plan, she explained the risk of potential 
litigation.
104
 This risk existed because the DIA would challenge any 
decision to monetize the art collection because, as Erickson testified, 
“protect[ing] the collection . . . is an obligation that we cannot 
shirk.”105 In such litigation, extensive analysis over whether the City 
or the DIA “owns” each individual painting might have ensued.106 
For instance, the “DIA contended that many donors of art pieces to 
the DIA had given with the expectation that the art would be in the 
DIA in perpetuity.”107 To support their claim, “[f]or months, the 
museum’s lawyers and staff pored through old files to find donor 
histories for many of the collection’s greatest works.”108 The hope 
 
from-the-bill-collectors. This evidence, the Court found, supported the contention that the art 
collection was being held in a public trust. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177. 
 102. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177. The predecessor to the DIA was the Detroit 
Museum of Art, and Public Act 67 of 1919 spelled out the details of the transfer of the DIA real 
property and its art from the Detroit Museum of the Art (later to be the DIA) to the City. Id. at 
177. This act required that that “property so conveyed shall in the hands of said city be 
faithfully used.” Id. At a meeting about the conveyance of this property, the Detroit Museum of 
the Art trustees agreed to “encourage and receive in trust and to administer future gifts and 
legacies.” Id.  
 103. Id. “[T]he DIA itself and even many of its individual donors would vigorously 
challenge any attempt by the City to sell any of the art.” Id. The sale of the art collection could 
also result in more than the cost of future litigation. The DIA’s operating budget is largely 
dependent on tri-county millage taxes; any sale could “result in the cancellation” of these taxes, 
which make up almost 70 percent of the DIA’s budget. Id. 
 104. Guillen & Helms, supra note 13. 
 105. Id. 
 106. There is evidence that “[m]ost of the art in the collection was donated by private 
citizens . . . and they probably never thought of their gifts as contributions to the city treasury.” 
Fisher, supra note 101. 
 107. Rick Cohen, Kresge’s Rapson Explains “Grand Bargain” at Detroit Bankruptcy 
Trial, NONPROFIT Q. (Oct. 9, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/10/09/kresge-s-rapson-
explains-grand-bargain-at-detroit-bankruptcy-trial/. 
 108. Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of Arts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit-
institute-of-arts.html. Erickson further stated that the DIA “would have been combing the 
archives for everything we could find if this had gone on.” Id. 
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was to find “provisions that would, at the very least, tie up in court 
for years attempts to sell the works.”109 
In addition to these arguments, the DIA and City further argued 
that the creditors’ position went against national museum standards. 
The DIA argued, and the court later agreed that “nationally accepted 
standards for museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay 
debt.”110 Contrary to this point, creditors suggested that the DIA is 
already an exception to “nationally accepted standards”111 for art 
museums, as the corporate governance structure is different from 
most other American museums.
112
 Furthermore, Erickson has stated 
that DIA board members have considered the sale of art from the 
collection previously.
113
 A more convincing argument that the court 
cited, however, was that the “creditors also admitted, perhaps 
grudgingly, that no creditor had ever considered the value of the art 
as a possible source of repayment when it decided to lend money to 
the City or to acquire City debt.”114  
Ultimately, the court agreed with the DIA and approved the City’s 
bankruptcy plan. In approving the bankruptcy plan, the court found 
that the DIA and its art collection were “critical to the feasibility of 
 
 109. Id. One example of the sort of restrictions found was for a painting called “The 
Dreams of Men” by Tintoretto. Id. The DIA found “restrictions imposed by the Italian 
government in the 1923 sale to the institute.” Id.  
 110. These nationally accepted standards for museums spring from the DIA’s membership 
with the Association of Art Museum Directors (the AAMD), which represents more than 150 
art museums in North America. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 176 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2014). The AAMD standards allow the sale of art to be used only “to replenish the 
collection through the acquisition of other works of art.” Id. Erickson testified at trial that the 
sale of art for the purpose of paying city debt could lead to the imposition of sanctions or 
penalties, which could, in turn, lead to the suspension of “all professional interchange.” Id. This 
suspension would mean that “the national and international art community would refuse to do 
business with the DIA.” Id. 
 111. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178. 
 112. See Jacoby, supra note 39. 
 113. Kennedy, supra note 108. Ms. Erickson stated: “There were times over the years when 
even members of our own board would say, ‘Why don’t we sell a piece of art to put a scab on 
our financial wounds.’ . . . [I]f your own board members come to that, you’ve been in deep 
trouble for a long time.” Id. 
 114. Nathan Bomey, The Best Quotes from Detroit’s Bankruptcy Ruling, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Nov. 9, 2014), file:///Users/Leah/Downloads/The%20best%20quotes%20from%20 
Detroit’s%20bankruptcy%20ruling.webarchive. 
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the City’s plan and to the City’s future.”115 Thus, the DIA and its art 
collection were not monetized to pay the City’s debts.  
Despite the court’s holding, the decision still raises questions of 
both law and policy. Was it proper to allow the art collection to be 
excluded from the bankruptcy plan? More importantly, what sort of 
policy impacts will, and should, this historic bankruptcy case have 
not only on municipality-owned art, but municipal bankruptcy? 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Was it Proper to Allow the Art Collection to be Excluded from the 
Bankruptcy Plan? 
Based on the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it was 
proper for the court to find that the DIA art collection was not an 
asset of the City that could be accessed by creditors.
116
 This 
conclusion is based on two sections of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which outline two independent tests that must be met by any 
municipality before a court may approve a bankruptcy plan for the 
municipality.
117
 
Several creditors of the City ensured that this issue did not 
disappear, as the creditors believed that they would receive more 
money from the sale of the art collection than they would from the 
amount promised to them under the so-called Grand Bargain.
118
 
Creditors therefore objected to the plan, asserting that the City’s 
failure to include the art collection of the DIA as an asset of the estate 
meant the plan was not feasible.
119
 
 
 115. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 218. The Court was effusive in praise of the DIA and 
the positive effect it had upon the City, stating “the DIA stands at the center of the City as an 
invaluable beacon of culture, education for both children and adults, personal journey, creative 
outlet, family experience, worldwide visitor attraction, civic pride and energy, neighborhood 
and community cohesion, regional cooperation, social service, and economic development.” Id. 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 943 (1988). 
 117. Id. 
 118. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177 (explaining that existing objections were 
because creditors wanted claims paid completely). 
 119. Matthew Dolan, Detroit Municipal Bankruptcy Trial Begins, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/detroit-municipal-bankruptcy-trial-begins-1409673491. The 
article also states that objections to feasibility have been raised by the treatment of city pension 
holders under the current plan. Id. The objectors argue “the plan unfairly benefits city pension 
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The relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which was the 
subject of drawn out trials, is 11 U.S.C. § 943, which lists the 
requirements that must be satisfied before a bankruptcy plan may be 
approved in Chapter 9. Section 943(b)(7) presents a two-part test, 
stating that the “court shall confirm the plan if—the plan is in the best 
interest of creditors and is feasible.”
120
 This relatively simple-
sounding final requirement before confirmation was actually the most 
complicated hurdle for the City to overcome.
121
 
In order for a plan to be “in the best interest of creditors,” in most 
bankruptcy contexts, “the payments under the plan to creditors would 
yield at least as much as would be received on a liquidation of the 
debtor’s business and the distribution of the proceeds to creditors.”
122
 
However, the circumstances of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy are quite 
different from that of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
123
 Therefore, “[t]he 
same interpretation does not work for a chapter 9 case.”
124
 Instead, 
 
holders over other creditors.” Id. Additionally, the plan is not feasible as it “fails to maximize 
fully the value of the city’s world-class art collection.” Id. 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) (1988) reads in its entirety:  
The court shall confirm the plan if—(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this 
title made applicable by sections 103(e) and 901 of this title; (2) the plan complies 
with the provisions of this chapter; (3) all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any 
person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the plan have been fully 
disclosed and are reasonable; (4) the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any 
action necessary to carry out the plan; (5) except to the extent that the holder of a 
particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides 
that on the effective date of the plan each holder of a claim of a kind specified in 
section 507(a)(2) of this title will receive on account of such claim cash equal to the 
allowed amount of such claim; (6) any regulatory or electoral approval necessary 
under applicable nonbankruptcy law in order to carry out any provision of the plan has 
been obtained, or such provision is expressly conditioned on such approval; and (7) the 
plan is in the best interest of creditors and is feasible. 
 121. Much of this difficulty arose from the complicated history of ownership of the DIA art 
collection. See supra Part II.B. 
 122. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 943.03. This best interest of creditors test 
is used elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code and is “codified in section 1129(a)(7) of chapter 11 
. . . as the general financial standard for confirmation of business reorganization plans where all 
classes of creditors and equity security holders accept the plan.” Id. 
 123. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 900.01[1] (“Municipal debt adjustment 
is unlike that for individuals or private corporations”). 
 124. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 943.03[7][a]. The reason a similar 
interpretation does not “work” is that a “municipality cannot be liquidated, its assets sold, and 
the proceeds used to pay its creditors.” Id. 
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“[t]he concept should be interpreted to mean that the plan must be 
better than the alternative that creditors have. In the chapter 9 
context, the alternative is dismissal of the case.”
125
 Dismissal would 
essentially leave creditors left without a structured plan of repayment. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate whether the proposed plan meets 
the “best interest of creditors” test, it is important to understand what 
would happen if the bankruptcy case had been dismissed. If this had 
happened, the Grand Bargain, which saved the art collection, would 
probably have failed.
126
 It is arguable that creditors would have 
received more money via dismissal than they will under the current 
plan which approved the Grand Bargain. 
The other aspect of § 943(b) is whether the plan is feasible, which 
meant that the City needed to “demonstrate its ability to make the 
payments required under the plan and still maintain its operations at 
the level that it selects as necessary to continued viability of the 
municipality.”127 The court, assessing the arguments that the plan was 
not feasible, stated “[s]ome creditors have argued that the City could 
pay more to creditors . . . by monetizing . . . the art of the DIA. No 
provision of law allows the creditors to access the DIA art to satisfy 
their claims.”128 Ultimately, the provisions of the Great Bargain, 
which the court called “miraculous,” provided creditors a plan that 
was in the best interest of creditors and was feasible, meaning the 
plan has now been approved.
129
  
 
 125. Id. In evaluating the alternative, however, “one must not be so carried away with the 
potentially adverse consequences of the alternative to a chapter 9 plan that one reaches the 
conclusion that any plan is better than the alternative.” Id. (emphasis in original). Furthermore, 
“[a] plan that makes little or no effort to repay creditors over a reasonable period of time may 
not be in the best interest of creditors.” Id. 
 126. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 127. Id.  
 128. In re City of Detroit, Mich. 504 B.R. 97, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). The court 
also stated this was the reason it found “[t]he market value of the art, therefore, is irrelevant in 
this case.” Id. 
 129. Id. at 181. “The pension reductions in the pension settlement are minor compared to 
any reasonably foreseeable outcome for these creditors without the pension settlement and the 
Grand Bargain.” Id. 
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B. What Sort of Policy Impacts Will, and Should, This Historic 
Bankruptcy Case Have Not Only on Municipality-Owned Art, but 
Municipal Bankruptcy? 
Part of the reason the City’s case was successful and occurred 
relatively quickly was that many creditors withdrew objections to the 
proposed plan, some of them directly because of the Grand 
Bargain.
130
 The court called these settlements with bond insurers “an 
extraordinary accomplishment in bankruptcy and an ideal model for 
future municipal debt restructurings.”131 Yet, this miraculous 
agreement is based primarily on charitable groups who were able to 
create the money for the Grand Bargain,
132
 and charity will no doubt 
continue to play a role as the City recovers from the bankruptcy.
133
 
There is some argument that the City needs to become revitalized 
through self-sufficiency, not charity.
134
 Furthermore, some argue that 
the DIA acted blindly in insisting on keeping the DIA exactly intact, 
instead of exploring possibilities for utilization of the art collection.
135
 
Some creditors also feel that the price of saving the art collection 
of the DIA was too high, as it came at the cost of a reduction in 
 
 130. Bomey, supra note 114. “The plan’s proposal is only possible because of the pension 
settlement and the Grand Bargain.” Id. See also In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177 (“Most of 
the objections to the DIA settlement have been withdrawn as part of settlements reached with 
those objecting creditors”). 
 131. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 248. The court was specifically speaking to the 
settlements reached with bond insurers. 
 132. These charitable groups are local and national foundations who have pledged to help 
the DIA make payments to the pension plans. Id. at 176. 
 133. Jenkins, supra note 14. Interestingly, “Detroit is in the same ballpark as San Francisco 
and New York as a recipient of municipal charity”, despite its drastically smaller population. Id. 
One example of contributing charity may come from Dan Gilbert, owner of Quicken Loans, 
who has focused on revitalizing the City’s downtown. See Joann Muller, Gilbertville: A 
Billionaire’s Drive To Rebuild The Motor City, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/joannmuller/2014/09/29/gilbertville-a-billionaires-drive-to-rebuild-the-motor-city/ 
#7b536a9c64eb.  
 134. Jenkins, supra note 14. “If Detroit is going to become a going proposition again, 
taxpayers and investors want to see a self-sustaining city, not a city overcommitted to restoring 
lost grandeur or dependent on pitying strangers.” Id. 
 135. Id. “The DIA could still have been Detroit’s art museum, just not in Detroit. The 
possibilities are endless: How about the Detroit Institute of the Arts of Guangdong Province, 
from which the city could be collecting a nifty royalty while bearing none of the costs?” Id. 
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pension benefits to city employees.
136
 The DIA and other benefactors 
have pledged to contribute to city employee pension plans as part of 
the DIA settlement.
137
 However, the City has enacted “modest” 
pension cuts that affect many city employees.
138
 For these creditors, 
the potential of millions from the monetization of the DIA art 
collection is not a debate about culture or bankruptcy assets; instead, 
it represents a source of funds that is not being pursued at potentially 
huge costs to those who have been planning their futures while 
relying on a certain amount of money to be available to them from 
their city employee pension plans.
139
 
Many, however, are happy that the art collection will remain in 
the City, which has held the art for many years. Citizens of the City, 
as well as proponents of the DIA, have argued that selling the art 
collection would have had negative consequences for the City long 
after the bankruptcy has run its course.
140
 The purpose of the City’s 
case was to “reverse this decline in basic services, to attract new 
residents and businesses, and to revitalize and reinvigorate itself.”141 
Stripping the City of works of art that draw tourists and showcase the 
cultural highlights of Detroit could derail that purpose.
142
 Indeed, 
some argued that removing a key cultural aspect of the City would 
undercut the effort to “revitalize” and “reinvigorate” the City.143 
Furthermore, experts have testified about the long-term effects that 
selling the art collection could have for the City.
144
 It is possible that, 
along with serving the DIA with a severe blow to its reputation, 
 
 136. Christine Ferretti, Bankruptcy Protestors Call Pension Cuts ‘Mass Robbery’, DETROIT 
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2014/ 
11/10/detroit-bankruptcy-protesters-pension-cuts/18800657/. See also In re City of Detroit, 524 
B.R. at 177. 
 137. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 176. 
 138. Eide, supra note 35. “Thanks to these funds, Detroit’s bankruptcy plan contained only 
modest pension cuts (for non-uniformed workers, 4.5 percent . . . for uniformed workers, no 
cuts to the basic benefit, just a reduction to cost of living increases).” Id. 
 139. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 276. 
 140. See AlHajal, supra note 9. 
 141. In re City of Detroit, Mich. 504 B.R. 97, 112 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 142. The DIA reports that in the 2013 fiscal year alone, it received 619,441 visitors. 
Museum Fact Sheet, supra note 43. 
 143. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 112. 
 144. Guillen & Snavely, supra note 16. 
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attendance would have decreased and donors would have ceased 
contributing art or contributing financially.
145
 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Municipal bankruptcy can be important for public entities in 
severe financial distress.
146
 Lawmakers, however, should be 
cognizant of the public nature of the municipality, because municipal 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy, more than any of the other chapters, balances 
the needs of the public with the needs of the creditor.
147
 Indeed, all 
other chapters strive to balance the needs of an individual or 
corporation with those of creditors; in Chapter 9, however, the 
individual is the public and the needs are those of the residents of the 
municipality itself.
148
 Perhaps because Chapter 9 bankruptcies are 
much fewer in number than any other chapter,
149
 this area of law is 
somewhat unexplored. The Bankruptcy Code needs to reflect the 
unique challenges of a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; specifically, 
the code should provide more guidance about what to do when, as in 
the City’s case, there is a question of balancing the fundamental 
services of a city with the demands of culture and other 
unquantifiable qualities of a municipality. 
These sorts of distinctions are made in other chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code. For example, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor 
to exempt certain property because the lawmakers have placed a 
higher value than liquidation upon it.
150
 The goal of bankruptcy is to 
 
 145. Id.  
 146. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, ¶ 900.01[1]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Judicial Business 2012, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-bankruptcy-courts.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). In 
the year 2008, for instance, there were a total of 1,042,806 bankruptcies filed; only 52 of that 
total were filed under Chapter 9 or 15. Even at its highest, only 107 of the 1,596,355 
bankruptcies filed in 2010 were Chapter 9 or Chapter 15. The most number of times a Chapter 9 
or 15 bankruptcy has been filed was in 2012, when there were 144 filed. These figures show 
how few cases that deal specifically with municipal bankruptcy exist, which creates a skimpy 
body of case law and a less robust discussion of the benefits and problems associated with a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Id. 
 150. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2010). A person’s jewelry and clothes are exempted up to a certain 
amount, as the law recognizes that we do not want those who turn to bankruptcy to be 
completely destitute in order to satisfy creditors. Id.  
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allow the debtor a “fresh start”; when there is an honest debtor, the 
goal is to help them manage those debts in a way that will benefit the 
greatest number of people, including creditors.
151
 
The City’s case highlights the deficiencies of Chapter 9 in dealing 
with the intangible benefits that cultural assets provide a 
municipality. Part of the reason the City’s case was able to highlight 
these deficiencies is because of the scale of the case. Because there 
has never been a municipal bankruptcy that has attempted to deal 
with the sheer amount of debt present here, the bankruptcy system 
had never before been called on to evaluate what value should be 
placed on the cultural highlights of a city without its cultural assets.
152
  
The court indirectly expressed the hope that “what happened in 
Detroit never happens again.”153 While one can certainly hope that a 
municipal bankruptcy of this scale will not be repeated in Michigan 
or any other state, the possibility exists. Therefore, we should think 
about the solution to the sort of crisis which was brought into being 
the moment the art collection of the DIA was potentially an asset of 
City. 
The DIA’s art collection has enormous cultural value to the 
City.
154
 It would seem unthinkable that if New York City were to file 
for bankruptcy, the Statue of Liberty could be sold to pay the city’s 
debts. While not nearly the iconic landmark that the Statue of Liberty 
is, the DIA art collection nevertheless has enormous cultural 
significance to the citizens of Detroit.
155
 As it is written, Chapter 9 of 
the Bankruptcy Code has no provisions that could save culturally 
significant assets of a municipality when bankruptcy is the only 
option forward. While the Grand Bargain certainly was 
“miraculous,”156 lawmakers should not rely on miracles to save the 
cultural assets of America’s great cities. Negotiations and agreements 
are always important in law, but there must be some recourse for 
cities when negotiations fail. 
 
 151. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 53, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
 152. See Hess, Sauter, & Wrigley, supra note 2. 
 153. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 154. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 155. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R at 176. 
 156. Id. at 181. 
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For this reason, I propose new legislative additions to the 
Bankruptcy Code, to create limited and specific exemptions for 
“cultural assets” of a municipality that files for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy.
157
 One difficulty with such a provision will be, of course, 
defining exactly what qualifies as a “cultural asset” in municipal 
bankruptcy.
158
 One way is to look to the definition of “culture.” 
Culture is defined as “the arts, beliefs, customs, institutions, and other 
products of human work and thought considered as a unit, especially 
with regard to a particular time or social group.” This definition 
should serve as the basis for lawmakers while crafting the term 
“cultural asset.” I also believe there can be a compromise reached 
with such legislation by exempting “cultural assets” only up to a 
certain dollar amount. Furthermore, to determine if something is a 
“cultural asset,” the legislature may require a vote of residents of the 
municipality. This vote would ensure that the assets protected in 
municipal bankruptcy actually have cultural significance to the 
residents of the municipality. 
The City’s bankruptcy case can serve as an important warning 
about the dangers of bankruptcy, but it can also serve as a model for 
the way cultural assets should be handled when these cases are 
inevitably filed. By adding provisions to the current bankruptcy code 
that would allow for “cultural assets” to be exempted, we can provide 
a way for bankruptcy courts to protect national treasures in those 
cases where no Grand Bargain exists. By doing so, our legislative 
body can ensure that we strike a balance in Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
cases between the importance of essential services to a community 
 
 157. It could be argued that this approach is an essentially optimistic view of the goals of 
bankruptcy, one which places value on idealistic visions of what a municipality can offer over 
the very real basic human needs of the citizens of these cities. I believe it is a compromise 
between the two. Furthermore, the “leniency of the U.S. bankruptcy code has long been unique 
in the Western world” and “it was our approach to bankruptcy that was chiefly responsible for 
allowing the U.S. to compete with other highly-developed European economies in the decades 
following the American Revolution.” Adrian Shirk, The Surprising Ways Bankrupt Cities Make 
Money, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/ 
selling-art-and-cutting-pensions-how-cities-get-money-when-theyre-bankrupt/384311/. Chapter 
11, for example, provides “in the most idealistic scenarios . . . entrepreneurial protection and 
encourages bold ventures.” Id. My proposal similarly encourages cities to invest in cultural 
assets by ensuring that those same assets would receive protection in case of bankruptcy. 
 158. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Culture, 
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=Culture (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
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and the importance of culture, which cities are so uniquely able to 
create. To ignore this essential balance between two conflicting 
interests would be to simplify municipal bankruptcy to something 
that it is not. Without such a provision, “cultural assets” could be lost 
from our cities, which would be a lasting and irreparable harm. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The City’s case has been decided, but it will be a long time before 
the ramifications of this historic bankruptcy filing cease to be felt.
159
 
We should not allow this case to pass by without considering what 
we value as citizens of municipalities, and how to balance the 
competing interests of basic human needs with the higher cultural 
aspirations many have for our cities. Finding and protecting that 
balance in the midst of bankruptcy may seem ironic. Yet it is what we 
protect at our weakest, most vulnerable moments as a society that 
truly showcases what we value most as a society. Crafting legislative 
protection for the “cultural assets” of municipalities will ensure that, 
even during the most trying times, cities are able to protect the value 
added by culture, whether that be through music, architecture or even 
art.  
 
 159. This statement is not merely about the impact of the case. Simply deciding whether 
the plan was feasible required projections into the City’s projected forty-year expenses. In re 
City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 225. The problems that led to the City filing bankruptcy were years 
in the making; extricating itself from the situation will also require many years and a great deal 
of effort. Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/14
